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The Primacy of the Passions1 
ABSTRACT: Value is not perceived as the empirical world is perceived but is constituted by 
the order and structure reflection and deliberation impose upon desires - the passions in our 
souls - that furnish the basic currency of evaluative and normative thought both as input 
(“intuition”) and output (considered normative judgements).  Perception, like our other 
cognitive resources, is nonetheless shaped and informed by the passions in our soul as they in 
turn shape and inform it.  Evaluative reason and justification is driven by our passions and 
ultimately grounded in them. While locally we generally desire things because they are 
valuable, globally, in the last analysis, they are valuable because we (at our best) desire them. 
Here the role of desire is grounding and global but it is still not Archimedean: it is not a 
matter of raw, brute desire but of evaluation informed by all the substantive ideals from 
which the whole complex web of our evaluative and normative thought itself is woven.  
KEYWORDS: Value; Desire; Reason; Perception; Moral epistemology. 
James Lenman 
1. 
This afternoon I rather fancy going for a walk. So I’m going for a walk. If my friend 
Septimus fancies coming along he may very well do so. As well as going for walks Septimus 
is quite partial to watching old westerns on TV with his friend Olivia. Happily it’s a partiality 
Olivia shares and so that is what they will be doing this very evening. 
Perhaps I shouldn’t. Perhaps Septimus shouldn’t. Perhaps Olivia shouldn’t. Perhaps I am 
supposed to be teaching all afternoon. Perhaps Septimus promised his wife he would stop 
seeing Olivia. Perhaps Olivia promised her probation officer she would stop seeing Septimus.  
But perhaps no such defeating conditions obtain. What more then do I, do Septimus and 
Olivia need to do, as responsible autonomous agents, to justify acting as we do, going for a 
walk, watching The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance?Not, surely, a whole lot. It’s natural to 
think that if I want to go for a walk or watch a western that normally just about suffices, 
absent defeaters, to make it a good idea, to do so.  
“Normally” is important. One way things might fail to be normal is if certain general 
considerations of coherence fail to obtain.2 Often, though certainly not always, a desire to do 
something is linked to a belief that, when I do it, I will like doing it.3 If such a belief turns out 
false there is normally a problem. I watch a TV show about skiing and think, That looks fun. I 
want to do that, So I book myself a skiing holiday and can’t wait to go. Then I do go and, it 
turns out, I hate it. It’s cold. It’s frightening. The food is awful. The people ghastly. I made a 
                                                          
1 Conversations with Anna Bergqvist and Luca Barlassina have helped me immensely. So 
have comments by Chris Bennett, Robert Cowan and Valerie Tiberius 
2 For more detailed thoughts about the coherence and stability of pleasure and desire see 
Lenman 2011. 
3 See Lenman 2011, p. 146. 
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mistake. Skiing is not for me. That is familiar enough. We all make those sort of mistakes in 
life.  
Something odder, rather less normal, would be if I didn’t entertain the false belief that I 
would enjoy skiing. I confidently expect to hate it. Puzzled you press me, So why do you want 
to go? Perhaps for some instrumental reason as I subject myself to other disagreeable 
experiences – visits to the dentist, say – for instrumental reasons? No, I say, I just want to. 
Then my desire looks odd, fetishistic, arbitrary, like a random desire to turn on a radio, not 
for the sake of the music and the pleasure of hearing it, just for the sake of turning it on.4  
On a good day our desires are reasonably stable over time. At six I want to listen to Just a 
Minute on the radio at half six. At six fifteen I still want to do this. Tuning in a half past I still 
want to do this. And now, at six forty-five, listening away, this still what I want to be doing. 
Of course when we’ve got hold of the desired thing talk of desire may become a little 
strained. We most often speak of desiring things we lack. Once we see the desired state of 
affairs has come into being we speak of liking it or welcoming it rather than desiring it. But I 
think it’s harmless enough to abstract a little. We say I want to go for a walk and then I like 
going for a walk. Or we can say I’m all for going for a walk before I go and, when it lives up 
to expectations, still all for it when it is under way. Going for my walk, I am doing what I 
want to be doing.5  
There’s certainly a pro-attitude, a desire broadly construed (and I will for the most part be 
construing “desire” very broadly to cover all the passions in our soul), that’s stably present 
across this process at those times when things go well. I want now to have then what I expect 
still to want then and thenceforth. This is a basic kind of coherence deriving from the interest 
I take at any time in how it is with me at other times. If my six o’clock self cares about my 
six forty five self, then he’s ordinarily unlikely to desire something for himself that he will 
then hate. If he doesn’t care, it would be odd if he bothered forming desires about what radio 
shows six forty-five me shall or shall not listen to. Unless perhaps my six o’clock self has 
some spiteful desire that my six forty-five self have an unpleasant time. That would be rather 
an odd way for a human being to be. I don’t much want to be like that. 
More generally a desire I have at a given moment to do this or that can conflict with a more 
global desire to be a certain kind of person or live a certain kind of life. I wake up every 
morning with a desire to lounge around in bed till midday. And I truly expect to enjoy 
lounging around in bed till midday. But I don’t want to be the sort of guy who is given to 
lounging around in bed till midday. So I make myself get up. (Well, on a good day.) But for 
such short-term, morally innocent desires as desires to take walks or watch westerns, such 
ideals of the person don’t necessarily kick in.  
Of course the mere fact that you want to do something is not much of a reason to do it. I have 
a lot of desires many of them very weak or very transitory. I have desires from which I am 
more or less alienated and view with disapprobation and disgust. A desire needs to be of 
                                                          
4 Quinn 1993. 
5 Cf. Oddie’s discussion of the”Platonic thesis”, 2005, pp. 70-72. 
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significant strength and reasonably durable to have much claim on my attention. And it needs 
to cohere with my values and ideals. Taking walks and watching westerns seems to be good 
stuff to be doing, for all sorts of reasons, better ways to pass the time than poisoning pigeons 
or watching porn. One might perhaps insist that desires should have no normative weight at 
all.6 I want to read Madame Bovary and I should read it, not because I want to but because it 
is likely – as I have abundant testimony-based reason to believe to – very good. Indeed it is 
for that reason I want it and it is that reason and not that my wanting it that gives me reason 
to do it. This thought is certainly on to something. As we’ve seen I want my pro-attitudes to 
what I’m going to do to cohere with my pro-attitudes to what I’m doing now and my pro-
attitudes to what I’ve done. I ordinarily want the things I want to be things that, when they 
happen, I welcome or enjoy and that, af er they happened, I don’t regret. But when this 
stability and coherence is in place, it seems hard to deny some normative weight to what I 
firmly and stably desire. It is important to most of us that the world conform as much as can 
realistically be hoped to our pro-attitudes even if we resist the fallacy, popular with some 
economists, of thinking that is all that matters. If Lewis really wants, and has for some time 
really wanted, to climb Snowdon, then Lewis has a reason to climb Snowdon, more of a 
reason than Louise who has no such desire even though the inherent worthwhileness of 
climbing Snowdon may give them both some reason to do so. Climbing all the Munros is a 
wonderfully worthwhile project and many people want to do it for that reason. But it would 
be an odd project to undertake just for that reason if you have no desire to. Indeed, still using 
“desire” broadly to cover any pro-attitude, an attitude with world-word direction of fit, it 
would be quite odd to deny all such attitudes any measure of normative weight. If you love to 
cook but hate to clean and your spouse has the opposite attitudes o those, it’s pretty obvious 
what domestic division of labour will make most sense for you both and why.  
 2. 
When we do epistemology we worry that justification is subject to a regress problem. As an 
epistemically responsible believer I might expect to be invited to justify my belief that Z and 
I might seek to justify it by invoking some other belief that Y that I take to warrant it. But 
why believe that? Well, maybe because X. But then… Of course there are three familiar 
ways to go now. One has it that this chain of justification stops somewhere, one that it goes 
on forever, and one that it goes round in a big circle. There are problems of course with all 
three of these possibilities and talking about them makes up quite a lot of epistemology. 
One nice strategy is that sometimes at least the regress bottoms out with desires, mental states 
that do not aim to fit the world and so don’t themselves call for epistemic justification. If the 
universe is to remain well-behaved enough for inductive reasoning to make sense, then it 
makes sense to use it but we’ll find ourselves in the soup if we don’t if we don’t. If it is not, 
we’ll be in the soup whatever we do. We don’t want to be screwed. So let’s use it. If  I have a 
lot more to gain, given my preferences, by believing God to exist should he do so than I have 
to lose by falsely so believing should he not. So, given my preferences, it makes sense to 
believe. Not believing you all have minds if you do would be a bigger disaster for me, again 
                                                          
6 Cf. Parfit, 2011, volume 1, chapter 3. 
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given my preferences, than believing you do if you don’t. So it’s rational to take that 
gamble.7 But there’s always a worry here that epistemic reasoning, the business we’re in 
when we seek to justify beliefs, demands epistemic reasons, not the more pragmatic kind of 
rationale supplied by speaking to our desires or preferences. Indeed there can seem to be 
something a bit disreputable about such pragmatic reasons. We may insist we want epistemic 
reasons for beliefs, reasons that speak directly to the truth of the thing to be believed to think 
things are true. However when we are concerned the normative domain, with practical reason 
this worry might seem less stark. Practical reason, especially on a roughly Humean picture of 
it, helps us to figure out how best to serve ends that our desires largely shape so what more 
natural place than desire for us to seek its ultimate ground. 
3.  
Beliefs have two big problems. They turn out to be wrong, misrepresenting the world. And 
they conflict with each other. Epistemic reason is how we try to respond to and fix those 
problems. Desires have, to begin with, one big problem. They conflict. Practical reason is 
how we respond to that. Reflective critical normative thought of the kind that takes us beyond 
mere problem-solving intelligence has these two problem, conflict and error, as its parents. 
But with practical thought, plausibly, conflict is the more fundamental of the two.  
In thinking about practical conflict, we turn naturally for inspiration to Frankfurt and his rich 
descriptions of the hierarchical character of desire.8 There are the desires with which I 
identify, the desires which I disown, the things I want which I want to want, the things I want 
which I do not want to want or am indifferent to wanting. If I can cure my mild 
shortsightedness by taking a pill that will relieve me of my weakness for lemonade I will take 
the pill like a shot. If I can cure it by taking a pill that will relieve me of my love of the operas 
of Britten or of my friend Alice’s company, I will abstain and continue to put up with 
wearing specs. I highly value being someone who loves Billy Budd an  Alice’s daft sense of 
humour. I’m not especially wedded to being a lemonade-drinker. There are features of my 
complex endowments of desires and aversions, loves and hates that I embrace, others I 
repudiate and disown. There are passions in my soul that I reflectively endorse, others I 
reflectively reject. Indeed it is natural to suppose that such reflective endorsement when it is 
decisively wholehearted and stable, is what valuing is.9 That thought in turn invites an 
expressivist picture where what judgements of value express is just such states, stable higher 
order desires and/or ground floor desires ratified at the court of stable reflection.  
Some are unimpressed by this picture. What, they demand to know, is so special about 
higher-order desires? What could endow them with any special authority? But this challenge, 
famously levelled by Gary Watson, seems to me one we can meet.10 The thing to remember is 
where we began, with the problem of conflict. Pre-reflectively, my desires are a chaotic 
bloody mess. I want to stick in here and keep writing this paper. I want to go home and watch 
                                                          
7
 Pascal 1670, pp. 355ff, Reichenbach 1938, chapter 5, Lenman 1994. 
8 Frankfurt 1988. 
9 Cf. e.g. Lewis 1989. 
10 Watson 1975. 
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the snooker. I want to order all the dishes on the menu, stay slim and save money. I want to 
be a rebellious free spirit. I want the contentment and security of stable bourgeois 
respectability. Post-reflectively, I’m sorry to inform you, I still want all these things. The 
ground floor of the structure that is my hierarchy of desires is irreparably disorderly and it is 
always going to be. So is yours. So is everybody’s. It might be otherwise were we very 
different kinds of animals but we’re not and it’s not. That’s human condition stuff. The 
higher stories, however, are, or at least can be made, more orderly. It’s a humanly realistic 
aspiration to arrive at a pattern of reflectively sanctioned, wholehearted desires, at what we 
might call an evaluative sensibility, that is at least tolerably coherent. That’s what’s special 
about the higher order.11 
But even when I stably and wholehearted endorse some wanting or liking of mine, there is a 
possibility that that stability might break down in the light of further, or better, reflection, 
(“better” here taken as expressive of my evaluative sensibility as a whole). Were I more like 
the kind of person I am disposed, stably under reflection, to want to emulate and admire, a 
person, that is, who is, by my lights, virtuous, I might not value what I now value. The 
valuings I am most confident about are those I am most confident will pass this test. The 
worry that some of my evaluations might fail it is readily to be understood as the worry that 
they might be wrong or, as we might say, false. And so begins the familiar transition from old 
school Stevensonian expressivism to quasi-realism. Normative facts and properties enter the 
scene at this point; truth and error. Desires speak or fail to speak to desires. Values serve or 
fail to serve values. Standards kick in and with them the kind of systematic normative 
discipline that permits evaluative utterances to behave, syntactically and logically, like 
assertions. When all this happens a space of desire comes to determine a space of reasons, of 
considerations that speak to the desires we endorse and embrace.  
On the Humean view I defend12, a space of reasons is a space of desires where the latter are 
the desires of a creature with a reasonably stable affective psychology that engages in 
reflection and deliberation in an effort to resolve the problem presented to it by the fact of 
conflict. And that creature, or one of those creatures, has got to be me. From a detached third 
personal perspective, there is nothing more going on than the unfolding of prosaically 
descriptive psychological facts. Normativity enters the picture when these psychological facts 
are facts about me, when I am myself the creature – or one of the creatures – who inhabits 
this psychology and seeks to direct his action wisely enough to shape a life that will bear his 
survey. Reasons are desires seen from inside, desires that, from their bearers’ p rspective are 
apt to confer importance on their objects, not least when they express deep features of our 
natures such as our instinct for self-preservation and our sociability. Only as the subject of a 
space of desires does one feel the volitional pull, the magnetism that Humeans take to lie at 
the heart of normativity.  
                                                          
11 I think this thought – or something very close to it - is at work in Bratman’s very rich 
discussions of Frankfurt and Watson. See his 2007, especially essays 3 and 10, especially 
section 7 of the latter. 
12 See further Lenman 2009A, Lenman 2009B, Lenman 2010. 
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Once we are in this business, desire moves, in large measure into the background of 
deliberation13 and it is reason, not desire, that structures our thought. Now evaluation and 
desire can diverge in ways that allow us to distinguish deliberative normative weight from 
motivational strength. The unwilling addict’s14 reflective endorsement of his desire for health 
and clean living assigns it a priority over his desire for narcotics despite the latter being too 
strong to resist.15 The backgrounding of desire also makes way for objectivity. Normative and 
evaluative thought pursued over years and generations endows us with complex normative 
and evaluative sensibilities that respect the kind of objectivity that insists that, while 
judgements of value may express desires, desires nonetheless do not determine values. My 
evaluative sensibility is constituted by a complex, aspiringly coherent set of reflectively 
endorsed desires. In having it I take certain things to be important and take their importance 
not to depend on my so taking them.16 So that my sensibility, while constituted by desires 
may or may not accord desires as such any normative significance. Chances are it will accord 
a good deal to some, but none at all to others. 
4.  
Now an imaginary reader might object that in saying what I just said I have gone back on 
what I said at the beginning. All that stuff in section 1 about wanting to do something as a 
reason for doing it. All that stuff in section 2 about desires as termini for justification. Didn’t 
I just, in the last paragraph, take it all back. 
No. I stand by section 1. Absent all kinds of things that might act as defeating conditions, 
morally innocent, short term desires like the desire to go for a walk or watch a western, can 
give us reasons to act on them. That’s a very weak, very modest claim. It’s not the claim that 
reasons talk reduces to talk of desires or talk of what would satisfy desires. That claim is a 
species of reductive naturalism that I just rejected. It is a view that is widely argued against 
on the grounds that (a) it analyses normative claims in ways that strips away their normativity 
and (b) it has repellent substantive consequences about what reasons people might have or 
might lack, for example that someone who is indifferent to future agony would have no 
reason to avoid it.17 My expressivist view has no such consequences. As I stressed in the 
preceeding section, it contrasts with any reduction of normative and evaluative talk to 
prosaically descriptive third person talk about our psychology precisely in capturing the 
dynamic, practical significance so plausibly essential to the former. And it has little or 
nothing by way of substantive normative consequences, repellent or otherwise. If I think you 
have reason to avoid the future agony to which you are indifferent, the fact of your 
indifference does not make me wrong to think that.  
                                                          
13 Cf. Pettit and Smith 1990. 
14 Frankfurt 1988, essay 2. 
15 A useful discussion of deliberative weight from an expressivist standpoint is Gibbard 2003, 
pp.188-191. 
16 See Blackburn 1984, pp. 217-220. 
17 See e.g. Parfit 2011, chapters 3 and 24. 
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However the claim about the normative significance of desire in section 1 is a substantive 
claim internal to normative talk. It is not a claim that attributes some kind of Archimedean 
significance to desire. It’s not a claim that is part of or that is implied by the metaethical 
position articulated in section 3. And yet I do want to claim, as I did in section 3, that 
ultimately desire, the passions in our souls, is the source of normativity. And I do want to 
claim, as I did in section 2, that desire is where justification, ultimately starts. How and in 
what sense? I’ll address that question in the final section of this paper. 
 5. 
Do we perceive value? It is widely supposed that we do and in various ways. Desires.18 
Emotions.19 Moral intuition.20 Regular sensory perception.21 All these have been proposed as 
ways this is meant to happen.22  
 
Sensory perception might certainly do the trick if we were reductive naturalists about value. 
On that view, evaluative and normative questions are straightforwardly empirical questions to 
be addressed in the very same way as empirical questions of other kinds. And perhaps also if 
we are nonreductive naturalists about value.23 Thus Richard Boyd famously asks: “What 
plays in moral reasoning, the role played in science by observation?” and responds, “I 
propose the answer: ‘Observation’.”24 But such empiricist views seem unpromising to me. In 
the light of a given substantive normative or moral perspective, certain moral questions may 
indeed reduce to empirical questions, Which options best promote human welfare? Or 
whatever. But it is much harder to envisage straightforwardly empirical ways of confirming 
or measuring the truth of the substantive perspectives such reductions inevitably presuppose, 
at least it is hard if our warrant for putting our trust in any test we apply is to be sufficiently 
independent of the very thing we are testing for the test to be at all meaningful.25 
 
Moral intuition, as understood by the more robust species of realist, is readily viewed with 
some suspicion, a dubious appeal to a poorly understood and desperately underdescribed 
species of, in effect, extra sensory perception whereby we somehow just “see” that we can 
turn this lethally targeted trolley this way in this case but not in that case. As Gibbard writes, 
“If this is what anyone seriously believes I simply want to debunk it. Nothing in a plausible, 
naturalistic picture of our place in the universe requires these non-natural facts and these 
powers of non-sensory apprehension.”26 And while many philosophers do continue to accord 
intuition a central role in the methodology of normative ethical thought, this role has long 
                                                          
18 Oddie 2005. 
19 Döring 2003. 
20 Huemer 2005. 
21 Boyd 1988, Audi 2013. 
22 The critical survey of these ideas that follows is very quick and dirty. For one that is slow 
and painstaking see Cowan 2011 (his criticisms are not the same as mine). 
23 Boyd 1988, Brink, 1989. The position defended by Oddie 2005 seems to me to be a kind of 
non-reductive naturalism.  
24 Boyd 1998, p. 124. 
25 See Zangwill 2008, Lenman 2013 for more detailed versions of this thought. 
26 Gibbard 1990, p. 154. Cf. e.g. Williams 1985, p. 94. 
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been the target of considerable criticism and scepticism.27 Yet, if we don’t embrace the 
Harean optimism that the whole edifice of our normative and evaluative can be constructed 
on the slender basis of “logic and the facts”28, it can seem hard to see how we could hope 
simply to dispense with it.  
 
I have myself defended a role in moral inquiry for intuitions where these are understood, 
along expressivist lines, as, in the first analysis29, desires rather than as beliefs or as quasi-
perceptual seemings. More precisely, I have defended a conception of moral intuitions as 
attitudes of unwillingness. So when I say I have a strong intuition that killing children for fun 
is wrong I express an unwillingness to accept or conform to any set of rules for the regulation 
of my community that permits members of that community to kill children for fun. This 
unwillingness is important to me and it is affirmed wholeheartedly. It resounds, as Frankfurt 
would say, through the higher orders.30 This is a good theory because it demystifies intuition. 
It doesn’t regard intuition as a mysterious species of extra sensory perception that puts us in 
touch with a domain of values constituted prior to and independently of our engagement with 
it. Indeed it doesn’t regard intuition as a species of perception at all. It is also a good theory 
because it helps us to see why intuition is important in moral inquiry. Moral inquiry is, most 
centrally, the practice in which we deliberate together about how to live with one another in 
moral community. When we arrive at the table of codeliberation sharing confident intuitions, 
they can be, as it were, banked, as considerations that will shape and constrain further 
reflection, not ordinarily to be supposed open to revision. Less confident intuitions are nearer 
the periphery of the web and may be more readily up for revision but will still have a shaping 
and constraining role to play. When I arrive at the table with an intuition you don’t share, 
that’s something, if our project of moral community is to succeed, that you need to respect 
and engage with, seek to reason me out of, be open to reason yourself into, accommodate, 
work around, in any case, not disregard. The foregoing picture of moral epistemology is of 
course a highly moralized one but that should neither surprise nor concern us. Moral 
epistemology need not and should not aspire to moral neutrality.31 
 
That leaves the passions in our souls, emotions and desires.32 These certainly frequently 
respond appropriately to the value we encounter in our lives. The smell of curry flooding the 
street as I pass the restaurant brings on a craving to eat some. I respond to your kindness with 
love and, much later perhaps, having come to love you, respond to your death with grief. That 
said, they very frequently do not so respond. The teenage palate doesn’t see anything to like 
in the taste of Bruichladdich. We see plenty. The crowds who line the street cheering the 
tyrant think they are looking at moral greatness. They are not. A good deal of emotion and 
desire misperceives value. Sometimes they do match up nicely but they only do so reliably 
and pervasively if one is a perfect phronimos and none of us, alas, can claim to be is one of 
                                                          
27 See e.g. Hare 1971, Brandt 1979, Posner 1999, Singer 2005, Appiah 2008, chapter 3, Kelly 
and McGrath 2010. I discuss some of these critics in Lenman 2007, Lenman 2015A and 
Lenman 2015B. 
28 Hare 1981, pp. 6, 101ff. 
29 Only in the first analysis as (a) with expressivism there is always a quasi-realist second 
analysis in the offing and (b) a certain kind of finessing is likely to be needed to evade wrong 
kind of reason worries: not just any old unwillingness for any old reason will do. 
30 Frankfurt 1988, pp. 21, 167. 
31 Cf. Lenman 2015A. 
32 Construing “desire” broadly as I do here, I don’t sharply distinguish these. Cf. Oddie’s 
remarks in his 2005, pp. 74-78. 
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those. Sense perception, by contrast, is normally reliable enough and only goes wrong in 
special circumstances as when we are drunk or mad or the light is playing tricks on us. But 
our desires are constantly going off in wrong directions, forever in need of policing by 
reflective scrutiny.  
 
Moreover a great many desires and emotions are not responses to their objects at all. My 
desire to go for a walk is not and cannot be a response to the walk I have yet to go on, even if 
my subsequent enjoyment of it is. Some day, he’ll come along, the man I love, thinks Bridget 
yearningly, after Gershwin. But her yearning is not very readily supposed to be caused, in 
anything like the manner of a perception, by its object. The loved man in question, alas, has, 
ex hypothesi, failed, as yet, to materialise and is thuin no position to cause anything where 
Bridget’s feelings are concerned. Of course we are normally responding to something in our 
experience. I have come, over the years, to know all about walks, what they are like and how 
they can be nice and that kind of general experiential knowledge shapes and directs the 
formation of my desires. But that kind of shaping over a history of experience seems much 
more analogous to a kind of induction than to the non-inferential immediacy we associate 
with perception. 
 
If  a robustly realist picture of intuition as perceptual or quasi-perceptual contact with 
independent evaluative or normative facts seems mysterious and poorly motivated, a 
similarly robustly realist understanding of emotion or desire as so placing us doesn’t look like 
much of an improvement. It simply takes the same not very credible story and clips it onto a 
rather different bit of our evaluative phenomenology. When we move away from realism to 
some more idealist take on the evaluative things might get less mysterious but at the same 
time close analogies with perception will perhaps become rather less natural. Certainly on my 
own account our experience over our lives of emotion and desire can be expected to shape 
and inform our evaluative and normative sensibilities but this is more naturally unpacked as a 
process of self-constitution or self-interpretation than a perceptual engagement with an 
externally constituted evaluative reality.  
 
6.  
Do we perceive value? It may still seem very natural to suppose we do. The passions in our 
souls light up (and sometimes darken) the world and we experience it so illuminated (and so 
darkened). The sunlight on the snows of the high peaks. The paintings in the gallery. The 
faces and bodies of loved others. The tastes and smells of the restaurant quarter. The rich 
experiential landscapes of nature and art are awash with beauty and wonder and the more we 
explore them the more we find.  
And yet the idea that we perceive value quickly comes under strain. With moral value his is 
perhaps especially clear. Often enough good and evil look very much the same. A case of 
wilful murder, carefully observed, can look exactly the same as a case of conscientious 
professional care. Here is a doctor administering an injection to a patient. What we see is not, 
on its surface, a whit different whether he is a good doctor treating her or a wicked doctor 
murdering her. Justice is likewise elusive. Here is a judge pronouncing a sentence. Here is a 
woman writing a cheque. Perhaps an injustice is being done. Perhaps a fraud is being 
10 
 
perpetrated. Just looking won’t tell you unless you know a lot of other, offstage, facts.33 But 
those too are still just facts. The vice escapes you as long as you consider the object.34 Even 
with the hedonic and aesthetic cases emphasised above, it is plausibly the sentiment within 
the onlooker’s breast by which the object is, by speaking to it, lit up. Warthogs, no doubt, 
sometimes look extremely sexy and alluring to other warthogs. To us they look, well, like 
warthogs. It’s not that they can see something we can’t – at least we have no reason to 
believe they can. They just like what they see in ways we don’t.  
There’s a physical world out there, most of it not of our making. It’s mostly constituted prior 
to and independent of our cognitive engagement with it. It’s made of atoms. It was there 
before we came along and it will go on being there after we’re gone. We know about it 
through perception, whereby it causally impacts on our receptive organs and surfaces. That’s 
how we know to avoid the bits of it that we might bump into or that might eat us, how to find 
the bits that are useful or just nice. Nothing about it, considered by itself, tells us what to do. 
That only happens when we start to care about something. Eating. Not being eaten. Sex, 
money, friendship, shelter, love, beauty, truth. The things we want. The things we like. Of 
course our wants make themselves known to us through experience but not exactly through 
sensation: reflective, not original impressions.35 Of course too our wants are not dumb, raw 
things. Nussbaum’s “neo-Stoic” view of emotions as judgements of value is plausibly an 
overcorrection of the view she opposes it to that sees them as “unthinking energies that 
simply push the person around, without being hooked up to the ways in which she perceives 
or thinks about the world”36 but the latter is certainly a view that cries out for some 
correction. Our passions are, or can be, intelligent things, things that inform themselves by 
our engaging cognitively with the world in all the myriad ways we know of engaging with the 
world: perception, induction, testimony, imagination (and of course that engagement with the 
imaginations of others that is literature and the other arts). Our passions shape and structure 
and informs our perceptual scrutiny of the world and it in turn shapes them. 
7 
It may help to consider the familiar order of explanation problem that philosophers 
sometimes raise about value and desire.37 Are things valuable because we desire them or do 
we desire them because they are valuable? It is sometimes tempting to respond Both and urge 
that the dichotomy is a false one. Consider Zuleika. Zuleika is, notoriously, immensely, 
overwhelmingly attractive. But what makes her so? Plausibly the fact that she possesses 
many characteristics that many people are disposed, pervasively and stably, to find attractive. 
It is just our stable, pervasive and patterned habits of attraction that make these characteristics 
attractive ones. It’s just our liking them that makes them nice. Once people have stable, 
pervasive and patterned habits of response and attitude, we can start to speak of things in the 
world as having the property of being such as to elicit such responses, the property in this 
                                                          
33
 Cf. Broad 1944, pp. 142-147. 
34 Hume, 3.1.1.26.  
35 Hume, 1.1.2, 2.1.1. 
36 Nussbaum 2001, pp. 24-25. 
37 See e.g. Griffin 1986, II, 3, Oddie 2015. 
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case, so conspicuously possessed by Zuleika, of being attractive. But now that this property is 
up and running we can ask the question, How are we to explain the fact that the Duke of 
Dorset, in particular, on this particular occasion, a dinner at Judas College, comes to be 
attracted to her? And in response we can invoke, informatively and non-trivially, the 
significant fact about Zuleika that she is attractive. So she is attractive because folk are 
attracted to her. And folk are attracted to her because she is attractive.  
Only, you see, I cheated there. I made things too easy for myself. “Attractive” is rather weak 
kind of evaluative concept. It’s a bit like “funny” in the sense on which something is funny if 
it makes us laugh even if we wish it didn’t, even if we ought not to. Notoriously, in his 
“Proof” of the Principle of Utility Mill errs, or appears to err, in supposing “desirable” is like 
that. 38 (“[T]he sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people 
do actually desire it.”) Being desirable is not just being disposed to elicit desire but being 
such as to merit desire. So we can’t surely say, in the same way, that something is desirable 
because we desire it or because it is the sort of thing people desire.  
If we are to moralise (or valorise) one of our explanatory relata, and if we are to avoid being 
pressured towards reductionism, we will plausibly want to moralise (or valorise) both. It’s not 
that it is the sort of thing people desire but that it is the sort of thing good people desire. But 
is it desirable because it is the sort of thing good people desire? Well, no. It’s desirable 
because of what it s, not because of how we (even if we are good) respond. It is, le ’s say, a 
long sought peace treaty. And peace treaties are desirable. Peace treaties are desirable 
because they end war. And wars are undesirable because they are hugely costly in death and 
suffering and because they are extremely suboptimal ways of settling conflicts that are highly 
favourable to power and largely indifferent to justice. And justice is desirable because… And 
so the story goes on. Its desirability is a matter of its place in the whole Big Web of reasons 
and values, not the mere fact that it triggers some psychological response. So do good people 
desire it because it is desirable? Well, yes, of course they do. But we needn’t understand that 
as a perceptual process where the good people “see” its value, simply as one where they see it 
clearly for what it is and bring their evaluative sensibilities to bear on it. The Big Web is 
made of desires but it is not always very immediately interested in them. It is interested in 
justice and peace and the avoidance of suffering and a million other things. That’s what 
pushes desire into the background amplifying the quasi-realist turn in favouring the realist 
side of the order of explanation question. Locally at least, we desire things because they are 
valuable but not vice versa. 
  
8.  
The Big Web is awfully big. It’s the space of reasons constituted by the whole of my moral 
sensibility. In fact it is really much bigger even than that. Evaluative and normative thought is 
not something we do on our own. Moral inquiry, particularly but by no means peculiarly, is 
dialogical. It’s a conversation we have with the rest of our community about how that 
                                                          
38 Mill 1861, chapter 4.  
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community should be ordered and what goods it should pursue. And that conversation does 
not start now, from here, but has been going on for as long as there have been people to 
conduct it. It is shaped by centuries of tradition that we have no hope, should we want to, of 
stepping outside and starting anew. Not least because it has “thickened” our very conceptual 
repertoire, shaping the most basic verbal tools we have to reflect on justice, generosity, 
fidelity, integrity, nobility, and everything else that is important to us. Our sensibility is 
ineliminably shaped by our communities and by our histories even when we bring it to bear 
on critical reflection on the often dubious practices of those very communities and the often 
ugly barbarities that often disfigure those very histories. That is why so much of the best 
work in contemporary metaethics emphasises the central role in moral theorising not of 
perception but of interpretation.39 Such work often represents itself as hostile to the kind of 
Humean picture I offer here but it needn’t be. The two are not opposed. Understanding the 
evaluative as intimately linked to and ultimately expressive of the passions in our soul should 
not lead us into what we might call the Existentialist Fallacy that the process of normative 
self-constitution is something to be undertaken ex nihilo right now from a standing start. It 
isn’t and cannot be like that. It’s a project we inherit and pass on.  
9.  
By the Big Web then I mean human evaluative sensibility, or at least human evaluative 
sensibility at its best. It is, as I have said, awfully big. Almost all the time we are inside it, 
engaging with the space of reason with desire in the background. Why is it justice good? 
Because I like it? No, silly. Justice is good because we are social animals and it allows us to 
live together in orderly, peaceably communities sharing the benefits of cooperation on terms 
acceptable to us all. Or whatever. And so on. Inside the space of reasons, the currency is 
reasons. It’s a space animated by the passions in our souls but so unobtrusively we barely 
notice and the practice of normative inquiry is almost exactly as the most robust of realists 
would say it should be. Our passions furnish the very fabric of our thought but it is not about 
our passions or at least not about them in particular. 
But we may distinguish global and local questions. The local questions are the ones we ask 
and seek to answer inside the Big Web inhabiting the complex evaluative sensibilities we 
bring to bear on them. We ask them all the time every day, big questions and small. What is a 
just society? Where shall I do this weekend? Here, inside the Web, the epistemology is 
coherentist as we seek to shape and order our thoughts towards something like reflective 
equilibrium. Then there is the global question, not about any part of the Big Web but about 
the whole damn thing. Looking at the Whole Thing in its totality, we want to ask, What 
justifies that? This, it seems to me, is the point where desire comes out of the background and 
even the quasi-realist has to qualify their line on mind-independence. This is where we say, 
You know what: it’s just us40. It’s just what we wholeheartedly want, drawing its authority 
simply from our willingness to embrace and endorse it. And that’s us all right, for from this 
supremely comprehensive perspective what want is who we are: Just us humans in all our 
                                                          
39 See e.g. Hurley 1989, Dworkin 2011. 
40 Pace, of course, Nagel 1999. 
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stark contingency and the best moral sense we can make of our world given the kind of beasts 
we are and the kind of stuff we care about. It’s just us but we, at our best, we suppose, by our 
own lights, are not so bad. We can be, we often enough are, quite horrible, but taken at our 
best, we find, or hope to find, ourselves able to embrace being who we are. Inside the Big 
Web the epistemology is coherentist but there is a foundational story to tell about the whole 
thing that comes to an end with the brute contingency of what we care about, 
comprehensively considered and our basic willingness to embrace and affirm our being that 
way.41 Locally we desire things because they are valuable but globally, in the last analysis, 
they are indeed valuable because we (at our best) desire them. Here the role of desire is 
grounding and global but it is still not Archimedean: it is not a matter of raw, brute desire but 
of evaluation informed by all the substantive ideals from which the web itself is woven. Even 
when we tell our foundational story we remain inside the web. Outside it there is normatively 
speaking nothing to say. The passions in our souls light up the world and we find on 
reflection that, so lit, it is not a bad place to be and we will be sorry to leave it. Or let’s hope 





                                                          
41 Even Dworkin comes close to recognising this: “External scepticism should disappear from 
the philosophical landscape. We should not regret its disappearance. We have enough to 
worry about without it. We want to live well and to behave decently, we want our 
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